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TAKING A MULLIGAN: THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES 
OF NARRATIVE CREATION IN THE 
POST-CONVICTION CONTEXT 
DONALD R. CASTER* AND BRIAN C. HOWE** 
INTRODUCTION 
“History is written by the victors” is a common phrase used to describe 
the sentiment that the victorious party to a conflict will have the power to 
write the history of that conflict.  In the courtroom, however, the opposite of 
that causal relationship exists: the party who can successfully create the most 
compelling history of the litigated dispute will emerge as the victor.  In this 
Essay, we discuss the myriad impacts of race and racism on the criminal jus-
tice system in the United States.  First, we address the structural advantages 
afforded to the prosecutor in the American criminal justice system.  The pri-
mary advantage is that the prosecution presents its case first and is able to 
construct the narrative that will dominate a trial.  We also address how the 
structural advantages may serve to distort the facts of a case and how this 
distortion may remain in effect even through the appellate phases of litiga-
tion.  Finally, we examine the challenges faced by post-conviction counsel in 
replacing the existing narrative with a new one that creates a compelling case 
for relief.  The creation of a provable, alternative narrative is particularly im-
portant for a defendant in post-conviction proceedings due to the deference 
afforded by reviewing courts to an underlying criminal judgment.  Indeed, 
the history of a particular litigation may be a crucial part of the new narrative.  
The need to excise the current narrative and begin again must be made clear 
to a reviewing court. 
I. RACE, NARRATIVE CREATION, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Any real understanding of the workings of the American criminal justice 
system must include an understanding of the impact of race on that system.  
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system are well-documented and un-
derstood.  Black men are two to three times more likely to be arrested during 
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their lifetimes than white men.1  Once arrested, black men are more likely to 
be charged than white men.2  Several studies have demonstrated that race 
plays a significant role in sentencing.3  Racial disparities are particularly 
acute in capital cases.4  And, race does not impact only the selection of and 
results for defendants.  While national statistics are sparse, a recent study of 
California prosecutors’ offices found that whites are “heavily overrepre-
sented” among California prosecutors.5  The study, conducted by researchers 
at the Stanford Criminal Justice Center, utilized self-reported data from dis-
trict attorneys’ offices in fifty-two California counties, which comprise about 
ninety-eight percent of California’s population.6  Data obtained from the dis-
trict attorneys were then compared against United States Census data.7  Cal-
ifornia does not appear to be an outlier when compared with the rest of the 
United States: only eight percent of Assistant United States Attorneys are 
black.8  The lack of diversity among America’s prosecutors can hardly be 
surprising: as of the most recent Census in 2010, whites accounted for eighty-
eight percent of attorneys across the country.9  The significance of racial dis-
parities in prosecutors’ offices becomes even larger in light of recent schol-
arship that emphasizes the role individual prosecutors play in creating or ad-
dressing systemic problems.10  Mass incarceration, a phenomenon that has 
                                                          
 1.  William Y. Chin, Racial Cumulative Disadvantage: The Cumulative Effects of Racial Bias 
at Multiple Decision Points in the Criminal Justice System, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 441, 444 
(2016). 
 2.  See, e.g., Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and State-
Level Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1628 (2012) (“After all, whites and blacks use illegal 
drugs at the same rates, yet African-Americans are many times more likely to be stopped, searched, 
arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced to prison for drug crimes.”). 
 3.  See Chin, supra note 1, at 445–46 (citing studies showing the impact of the sentencing 
judge’s race, the defendant’s complexion, and the defendant’s race on sentencing). 
 4.  See Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. 
REV. 807, 811–12 (2008) (“The current research suggests that the race of the defendant and victim 
are both pivotal in the capital of capital punishment: death was more likely to be imposed against 
black defendants than white defendants, and death was more likely to be imposed on behalf of white 
victims than black victims.”). 
 5.  KATHERINE J. BIES ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STUCK IN THE ‘70S: THE 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF CALIFORNIA PROSECUTORS 10 (2015), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/04/Stuck-in-the-70s-Final-Report.pdf. 
 6.  Id. at 8. 
 7.  Id. at 9. 
 8.  Id. at 8–9. 
 9.  AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2015.authcheck-
dam.pdf. 
 10.  See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 147–48 
(2016) (arguing prosecutors are responsible for increased reliance on guilty pleas rather than jury 
trials for disposition of criminal cases); Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice 
System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 203 (2007) (“Unwarranted 
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captured the attention of America’s political class recently, also has a racial 
component.11 
Race also plays less obvious roles in the criminal justice system.  A 
growing body of scientific evidence points to the inaccuracy of eyewitness 
identifications, particularly by those who attempt to identify the perpetrator 
of a crime when that perpetrator is a stranger of a different race.12  Addition-
ally, race can infest a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in ways that 
cannot come to light until years after the fact.13  When everything that is 
known about how race and racism influence the criminal justice system is 
taken together, a conclusion emerges: the system is “drastically broken.”14 
This is the backdrop, then, against which the creation of narratives in 
the criminal justice system must be understood.  To talk about narrative cre-
ation in the criminal justice system is to talk about stories told disproportion-
ately about black people, but told predominantly by white people.  This is 
why defense counsel must make use of the opportunity afforded in the post-
conviction context to “take a mulligan”—to redo what the criminal justice 
system has done in a way that is fair to a defendant and that offers a story 
free of racial and structural frames and biases. 
II. NARRATIVE CREATION IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL 
The importance of legal storytelling during a criminal trial is well-doc-
umented.15  Bar journals—aimed at practitioners—are replete with articles 
about how best to persuade through narrative creation at trial.16  Defense at-
torneys are expected to develop a narrative in their preparation for trial: “De-
veloping a theory of the case that encompasses the best interests of the client 
                                                          
racial disparities cannot be eliminated without the active participation of prosecutors.”); John F. 
Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41 (2012) 
(arguing that individual prosecutors are responsible for increased rates of incarceration). 
 11.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS 187–89 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 12.  See generally John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Iden-
tifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2001). 
 13.  Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (reversing a nearly thirty-year-old con-
viction after prosecutors’ voir dire notes showing evidence of racial bias in jury selection were dis-
covered). 
 14.  Stephen J. Fortunato Jr., Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L. 
REV. 481, 482–83 (2005). 
 15.  See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1995) 
(noting that “[l]egal storytelling enmeshes narrative tension or dissonance in the conventions of 
advocacy”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, For Effective Persuasion, Don’t Neglect the Narrative, J. 
KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 12, 12; Heather J. E. Simmons, Practical Magic: How the Ancient 
Art of Storytelling Can Make Us Better Lawyers, MICH. B.J., Aug. 2015, at 52, 52; Sunwolf, Talking 
Story in Trial: The Power of Narrative Persuasion, CHAMPION, Oct. 2000, at 26, 26. 
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and the realities of the client’s situation will help counsel evaluate various 
choices throughout representation . . . .”17 
The use of narratives in trials is not a recent phenomenon, and its long 
history is well-documented in legal scholarship.18  As at least one scholar has 
pointed out, however, that narrative creation does not necessarily assist the 
trier of fact in reaching a just or correct outcome: 
[T]he persuasiveness of a story does not turn on its truth.  It turns 
on its narrative rationality—its logical coherence, its correspond-
ence to audience expectations.  This is problematic in a legal con-
text because we want listeners, be they juries, judges, clients, or 
even opposing parties, to be influenced by the truth.  In the legal 
context, truth matters.  If stories can persuade whether they’re true 
or not, that’s not good.  If lawyers tell stories that are coherent but 
false, they cross the line from persuasion to manipulation.19 
The potential of a false narrative to persuade a factfinder can be partic-
ularly problematic in the criminal setting.  A factually untrue narrative that is 
accepted by a jury or judge results in a wrongful conviction.20 
The widespread understanding of the importance of narrative creation 
should be of interest.  After all, no formal rule requires a prosecutor (or de-
fense attorney) to utilize storytelling to secure a conviction (or an acquittal).  
To convict a defendant, the prosecution must establish all of the elements of 
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.21  Neither criminal proce-
dural rules nor evidentiary rules speak of storytelling.  Instead, telling a story 
is the method by which the prosecution meets its constitutional burden, and 
the procedural and evidentiary rules establish limits on the prosecution’s sto-
rytelling methods. 
Because the law focuses only on the prosecution’s burden, and not that 
how to practically meet—and combat—this burden through the creation of a 
narrative, the American criminal justice system gives the prosecution signif-
icant advantages in creating a dominant trial narrative.  In jurisdictions where 
                                                          
 17.  NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION 61 (1995); see also, e.g., Anthony Natale, Theory and Themes/Storytelling 4 (un-
published manuscript) (Jan. 8, 2015) (on file with authors) (defining “theory of the case” as “a 
positive, affirmative statement as to what really occurred and what the law directs should happen to 
an individual who has been accused in this particular situation”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown, 6 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1994). 
 19.  Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of 
Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 63, 68 (2010). 
 20.  Ralph Grunewald, The Narrative of Innocence, or, Lost Stories, 25 L. & LITERATURE 366, 
368–69 (2013). 
 21.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970). 
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voir dire is conducted by counsel rather than the bench, for example, the pros-
ecution is the first to address prospective jurors.  The prosecution is the first 
to deliver an opening statement.  The prosecution puts on its witnesses first, 
before the defense is able to call witnesses who may provide compelling, 
defense-friendly narratives, such as an alibi or a justification.  In many juris-
dictions, the prosecution delivers the first closing argument and is entitled to 
speak to the jury last through rebuttal.  In addition to all of these significant 
advantages, the prosecution controls the timing of when the case goes to trial 
and the preparatory advantages inherent in holding those reins.  The defense, 
on the other hand, must scramble to construct its narrative in the time between 
the initiation of charges and the beginning of a trial. 
Despite the formal burden placed on the prosecution, the practical im-
pact of giving the prosecution the upper hand in narrative creation may pose 
an impossible challenge for defense counsel: 
 Unaware of narrative dynamics, jurors are susceptible to drama-
tizing elements that are introduced in court and to constructing 
their stories from case-specific information acquired at trial and 
their expectations about what makes a complete story.  What rea-
sons, for example, exist to shave a beard?  Kevin Byrd, who was 
wrongfully convicted of a rape, shaved his goatee the day before 
he got arrested.  He claimed that he simply got tired of it, but the 
prosecutor contextualized this event differently: the defendant 
changed his facial features.  In court, this element became “dra-
matic” although it was simply a random coincidence.  If a prior 
conviction is introduced in court, it can have the same dramatic 
effect.  The defendant is portrayed as a specific “type,” as someone 
who typically commits crimes (even if these crimes are unrelated 
to the one in question).  The jury is not equipped to disregard this 
kind of information.22 
Despite the importance of narrative creation in persuading a jury, the 
decision to engage in legal storytelling is not an automatic one for defense 
counsel.  Defense counsel must weigh the decision to tell a client’s story in 
the most persuasive manner possible alongside several other factors, often 
overlooked in the scholarly literature.  For example, counsel must consider 
whether the factfinder is a judge or a jury, the identity of the factfinder, the 
skills of the assigned prosecutor, the viability of the defendant’s narrative, 
                                                          
 22.  Grunewald, supra note 20, at 380 (footnotes omitted) (citing John H. Blume, Every Juror 
Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense (Cornell 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-042, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=942653). 
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and the witnesses on each side.23  And, defense counsel should consider how 
his or her storytelling efforts at trial may play out on appeal.24  Many of these 
considerations are also important to prosecutors, who are also striving to craft 
a narrative.25 
A stark picture of the criminal justice system thus emerges.  A defendant 
is disproportionately likely to be a person of color.  Prosecuting decisions, 
however, are probably going to be in the hands of white people.  Should a 
defendant decide to risk a trial,26 he will face a prosecution team that has 
already crafted a narrative.  Once the trial begins, the prosecution team will 
have several built-in advantages in selling its story to the trier of fact.  In 
particular, the prosecution sells its story first, providing the opportunity for 
that narrative to become embedded in the jury’s or judge’s consciousness.  
And while defense counsel will (or should) understand the persuasive value 
of narratives and the value in crafting a counter-narrative that tells the de-
fendant’s story, other considerations may force him to forego such a strategy.  
Against such a backdrop, it can hardly be surprising that wrongful convic-
tions—stemming from the acceptance of a false narrative—are increasingly 
common.27  A criminal trial is structured in such a way as to favor the per-
petuation of the prosecution’s narrative.  And even if that narrative is based 
on distorted evidence, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to un-tell, given 
the structural restraints of a criminal trial. 
III. THE NARRATIVE ON APPEAL 
Once a defendant is convicted, the chances that he can successfully de-
feat the prosecution’s narrative on appeal become even slimmer.  This is be-
cause significant structural barriers are imposed to protect the narrative that 
prevails at trial.  Should a defendant challenge a trial court’s decision to admit 
or exclude evidence, for instance, he will need to establish that the trial court 
abused its discretion.28  A defendant who argues to an appellate court that the 
                                                          
 23.  Todd A. Berger, A Trial Attorney’s Dilemma: How Storytelling as a Trial Strategy Can 
Impact a Criminal Defendant’s Successful Appellate Review, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 297, 318 (2012). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See generally JOHN BOBO, THE BEST STORY WINS (AND OTHER ADVICE FOR NEW 
PROSECUTORS) (2010). 
 26.  While not the subject of this Essay, the decision to go to trial itself is both fraught with 
consequences and increasingly rare.  See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/. 
 27.  See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015 1 (2016), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf (noting 
that 2015 saw a “record number” of exonerations in the United States). 
 28.  See, e.g., United States v. Guerrier, 428 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 2005); People v. Waidla, 996 
P.2d 46, 61 (Cal. 2000); People v. Powell, 55 N.E.3d 435, 440 (N.Y. 2016) (citing People v. Schulz 
829 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (N.Y. 2005)). 
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prosecution’s narrative was supported by evidence sufficient to challenge a 
conviction faces an even more difficult challenge in most jurisdictions.  Con-
sider this recent description of what a defendant must do to successfully chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him on direct appeal from a 
federal conviction: 
 Any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence comes with “a 
heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden.”  To prevail, [a de-
fendant] “must convince us that even after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact 
could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”29 
The task is no less onerous in most state appellate systems, where a trial 
court will similarly review the facts in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution.30  Should a defendant convicted in state court seek federal review of 
his conviction through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, federal law 
makes challenging his conviction even more difficult.  A federal court is 
bound to accept the factual findings of a state court unless the proceedings in 
state court “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro-
ceeding.”31  In deciding whether a state court’s factual determination was 
“unreasonable,” the habeas court is bound by the factual record as it existed 
at the time of the state court adjudication.32 
Given the structural barriers to the presentation of a defense-friendly 
narrative on appeal, the manner in which appellate courts interpret the trial 
record is predictable.  Judges write their opinions to support what is, more 
                                                          
 29.  United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 403 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 30.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 652 N.E.2d 721, 732 (Ohio 1995) (noting that “when a defend-
ant challenges the legal sufficiency of the state’s evidence, ‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’” (first quoting State v. 
Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 494 (Ohio 1991), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in 
State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997); and then citing State v. Waddy, 588 N.E.2d 819, 825 
(Ohio 1992)). 
 31.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012). 
 32.  In Cullen v. Pinholster, the Supreme Court barred the expansion of the state court record 
in habeas proceedings: 
  We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before 
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.  Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the 
past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, 
or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law.  This backward-looking 
language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.  It 
follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same 
time—i.e., the record before the state court. 
563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011). 
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often than not, their ultimate conclusion: that the lower court should be af-
firmed.  In the criminal context, that means deferring substantially to the trial 
court’s and prosecution’s framing of a case.  Two examples—one made fa-
mous by popular culture, the other noted by a late Supreme Court Justice—
aptly illustrate the point. 
In late 2015, the documentary series Making a Murderer33 ignited the 
passions—and furies—of not just legal practitioners and jurists, but the gen-
eral public.  The series, released on the online streaming service Netflix, told 
the story of how Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey were convicted of the 
murder of Teresa Halbach.34  By the time he was charged with that murder, 
Avery had a history with the criminal justice system; in 1985, he was con-
victed of rape, only to be freed based on the results of DNA testing eighteen 
years later.35  Avery returned to the same community in which he grew up—
the same community in which he was wrongly convicted of rape and whose 
police department he sued following his exoneration.36 
In affirming Avery’s murder conviction, the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals explains matter-of-factly why he was a suspect: 
Halbach’s clients included Auto Trader magazine.  In the morning 
of October 31, 2005, Steven Avery called Auto Trader magazine 
to arrange for Halbach to photograph a vehicle at the salvage yard.  
Halbach had taken photos of vehicles at the Avery salvage yard on 
five prior occasions.  At the time of her disappearance, it was be-
lieved that Halbach was last seen taking photos at Avery’s Auto 
Salvage.37 
Indeed, the court leaves little room for doubt that the prosecution pre-
sented a strong case against Avery: 
 During the course of the search, the police found, among other 
things, burned bone fragments, including skull fragments, in and 
around a burn pit behind Avery’s garage with DNA consistent with 
that of Halbach; blood in the front area of Halbach’s vehicle that 
was later determined to have come from Avery; blood in the cargo 
area of the vehicle that was later determined to have come from 
Halbach; and remnants of a cell phone, Palm Pilot and camera in a 
burn barrel in Avery’s yard of the same models owned by Halbach.  
While conducting a sixth search of Avery’s trailer on November 8, 
                                                          
 33.  Making a Murderer (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015). 
 34.  Jethro Nededog, Everything You Need to Know from “Making a Murderer” if You Don’t 
Want to Spend 10 Hours Watching, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2016, 3:01 PM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/netflix-making-a-murderer-recap-2016-1. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  State v. Avery, 804 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). 
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officers discovered the key to Halbach’s vehicle in Avery’s bed-
room.  The key was later determined to have Avery’s DNA on it.  
In a search conducted in March 2006, after Avery had been 
charged, police recovered a nearly intact bullet and bullet frag-
ments from Avery’s garage that came from a rifle found in Avery’s 
trailer and contained DNA belonging to Halbach.38 
Making a Murderer, though, provides a different story.  In the fourth 
installment of the series, we learn that only Avery’s DNA was present on 
Halbach’s keys.39  One would have expected that, since the keys originally 
belonged to Halbach, her DNA would be present on the keys as well.40  More-
over, the provenance of the keys is questionable because the police searched 
Avery’s house several times before finding the keys underneath a pair of 
shoes in Avery’s bedroom.41  The officer who found the keys was from the 
department that was being sued by Avery, despite the conflict of interest his 
involvement would seem to pose.42 
Even if one discounts the discovery of Halbach’s keys, certainly the 
presence of Avery’s blood in Halbach’s car is strong, circumstantial evidence 
of guilt.  Except that this evidence, too, may have its own story.  Avery’s trial 
attorneys learned that a vial of Avery’s blood—which had been collected and 
preserved in connection with his wrongful conviction for rape—may have 
been subject to tampering.43  The vial’s lid had a small, syringe-sized hole.44 
Eliminate the keys and Avery’s blood, however, and strong evidence of 
guilt arguably remains.  The victim’s car was found on Avery’s sprawling 
property regardless of what was inside of that car.45  Interestingly enough, 
however, the car is also the subject of a subplot.  Two days before the car was 
“discovered” by volunteers searching the area for evidence pertaining to Hal-
bach’s whereabouts, a police officer—again, from the department being sued 
by Avery—called into police dispatch with the license plate number of that 
car.46  When he was told by a dispatcher the car belonged to Halbach, he 
immediately replied, “’99 Toyota, right?”47  At trial, he was unable to explain 
how he knew the make of Halbach’s car.48 
                                                          
 38.  Id. at 221. 
 39.  Nededog, supra note 34. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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The presence of a bullet with Halbach’s DNA in Avery’s garage, none-
theless, posits a compelling argument for Avery’s guilt.  That argument is 
weakened, however, by critical, additional information: the bullet was found 
only on the fifth search of Avery’s garage—discovered by, of course, a mem-
ber of the law enforcement agency being sued by Avery—and the forensic 
scientist who tested the bullet for DNA contaminated the sample with her 
own DNA.49 
The appellate decision affirming Avery’s conviction neglects to empha-
size facts that, as depicted in Making a Murderer, cumulatively form a nar-
rative supporting reasonable doubt, if not outright innocence.50  The appellate 
court does not mention that one of the principal agencies responsible for in-
vestigating the crime had previously been responsible for wrongfully con-
victing Avery and was being sued for it.51  It leaves out questions about how 
evidence was found.52  It offers no hint that the defense argued that some 
evidence may have been planted, and other evidence may have been subject 
to shoddy forensic testing.53  Instead, the appellate court tells a narrative that 
leads to the legal conclusion it ultimately reaches: Avery was guilty of the 
murder of Teresa Halbach.54 
For many, Making a Murderer was a lesson about the injustice present 
in the American criminal justice system.55  But for both the legal profession 
and the academy, it should be a primer on the importance of narrative.  Over-
all, very few facts were presented in the documentary that were not presented 
to the jury.  But based on accounts in the popular press, the reaction to the 
series was overwhelmingly sympathetic to Avery, a convicted murderer.56 
                                                          
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Making a Murderer devotees will no doubt notice other facts depicted in the show that are 
not mentioned by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  The authors have not sought to provide an 
exhaustive list of all such facts, but merely a representative one.  
 51.  Nededog, supra note 34.  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  State v. Avery, 804 N.W.2d 216, 242 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). 
 55.  To be sure, Making a Murderer has its share of critics, who believed the series told its story 
unfairly.  E.g., Samantha Grossman, Here’s What Was Left out of Making a Murderer, TIME (Jan. 
5, 2016), http://time.com/4167699/netflix-making-a-murderer-evidence-left-out/; Daniel Victor, 
Making A Murderer Left out Crucial Facts, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/arts/television/ken-kratz-making-a-murderer.html?_r=0. 
 56.  See, e.g., June Thomas, What Really Makes Making a Murderer So Good? There’s No 
Narrator., SLATE (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/brow-
beat/2015/12/30/what_really_makes_making_a_murderer_so_good_unlike_se-
rial_and_the_jinx_there.html (noting that the show convinced the author, a “woman and a cat 
lover,” to “side with an accused murderer/rapist whose rap sheet involves mistreatment of a cat”); 
German Lopez, Netflix’s Making a Murderer Exposes Flaws that Go Far Beyond Steven Avery’s 
Trial, VOX (Jan. 15, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/1/12/10755690/netflix-making-a-
murderer-avery-guilty (“Netflix’s Making a Murderer has, for many, led to just one question: Is 
Steven Avery innocent?”). 
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The reaction provoked by Making a Murderer is at least partially caused 
by the manner in which its producers chose to tell the story of Avery’s con-
viction.  Unlike most crime procedurals—both fictional and nonfictional—
the producers were embedded with the defense team rather than the prosecu-
tion.  By the time the account of Avery’s trial began, the audience may have 
been predisposed to be sympathetic towards Avery, as the series recounts his 
wrongful conviction and the nearly two decades he spent in prison for a crime 
he did not commit.57  Ultimately, Making a Murderer presents a criminal trial 
in a very different way than the American public is used to seeing one.  It 
tells Avery’s story in the way that defense counsel might have if he or she 
could alter the structure of a trial.  In the documentary, portions of the direct 
testimony of government witnesses are immediately followed by the relevant, 
corresponding portions of their cross-examination.58  When the documentary 
presents the testimony of a key government witness, it follows that testimony 
immediately with the contradictory testimony of a defense witness.59  During 
normal trials, however, the jury waits hours or days (and in some notable 
cases, weeks or even months) between hearing a government witness and 
hearing a defense witness with a contrary opinion.  Ultimately, Making a 
Murderer is an excellent demonstration that the manner in which facts are 
assembled can be even more persuasive than the facts themselves. 
The narrative of the Avery trial may be more easily unraveled and re-
woven than many criminal prosecutions, as the two co-defendants and the 
victim all were white.  Long-standing, institutionalized racial biases against 
black defendants present in many criminal trials thus played no part in the 
Avery case.  Nonetheless, the documentary is a quintessential illustration of 
the power of the structural advantages of the prosecuting team in American 
criminal trials. 
The case of Henry Lee McCollum also shows the impact that prosecu-
tion-friendly narratives can have throughout the criminal justice system.  
McCollum, a black man, was convicted of rape and murder and sentenced to 
death.60  The Supreme Court of North Carolina summarized the trial evi-
dence: 
 The defendant, Henry Lee McCollum, gave a statement to law 
enforcement officers on 28 September 1983.  In this statement, the 
defendant McCollum said that he saw Sabrina Buie and Darrell 
Suber come out of Suber’s house at approximately 9:30 p.m. on 24 
September 1983.  McCollum, Chris Brown, Louis Moore and Leon 
Brown joined Sabrina Buie and Darrell Suber, and the group then 
                                                          
 57.  Making a Murderer (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 148 (N.C. 1993). 
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went to a “little red house near the ballpark.”  The five males tried 
to convince Sabrina to have sexual intercourse with them, but she 
refused.  Two of the males went to a store and purchased some 
beer.  When they returned, the males discussed having sexual in-
tercourse with Sabrina.  Louis Moore refused to participate and 
left. 
 The four remaining males and Sabrina then walked across a soy-
bean field and sat in some bushes where they drank beer.  Suber 
stated that he was going to have sexual intercourse with Sabrina.  
At this point, the defendant McCollum grabbed Sabrina’s right arm 
and Leon Brown grabbed her left arm.  Eleven-year-old Sabrina 
then began to yell, “Mommy, Mommy” and “Please don’t do it.  
Stop.”  Suber then raped Sabrina while the defendant and Brown 
held her arms.  Subsequently, each man raped Sabrina while the 
others held her.  Leon Brown then sodomized the child while Chris 
Brown held her. 
 After the men had raped and sodomized Sabrina, Suber said “we 
got to do something because she’ll go uptown and tell the cops we 
raped her.  We got to kill her to keep her from telling the cops on 
us.”  The defendant McCollum grabbed Sabrina’s right arm while 
Leon Brown grabbed her left arm.  Chris Brown knelt over Sa-
brina’s head and pushed her panties down her throat with a stick 
while Leon Brown and the defendant held her down.  After deter-
mining that the child was dead, the defendant and Chris Brown 
dragged her body away to a bean field to hide it from view.61 
What about McCollum’s narrative?  How did that fit into the court’s 
rendering of the facts?  The court simply stated, “[o]ther evidence introduced 
at trial is discussed at other points in this opinion where pertinent to the issues 
raised by the defendant.”62  Absent from the court’s factual summary is that 
McCollum, nineteen years old at the time, was interrogated for five hours 
without an attorney present and while his mother was not permitted to see 
him.63  Moreover, McCollum recanted his confession at trial, and two of the 
men mentioned in his confession were never prosecuted.64 
Shortly after the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed McCollum’s 
conviction, another defendant sentenced to death in a wholly unrelated case 
from a different part of the county sought a writ of certiorari from the United 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 149. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, DNA Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/us/2-convicted-in-1983-north-caro-
lina-murder-freed-after-dna-tests.html. 
 64.  Id. 
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States Supreme Court following the denial of his own petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.65  The Court denied certiorari, provoking a dissent from Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun.  He argued that “despite the effort of the States and 
courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules . . . the death penalty re-
mains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.”66 
Justice Antonin Scalia elected to pen a concurrence responding to Jus-
tice Blackmun, apparently seeking to legitimatize the death penalty as an in-
stitution.67  In so doing, he chose the McCollum case to illustrate the utility 
and fairness of the death penalty, arguing that, in light of McCollum’s con-
duct, any argument that the Eighth Amendment forbade the execution of 
American citizens should be viewed as foreclosed: 
How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared with 
[McCollum’s crime]!  If the people conclude that such more brutal 
deaths may be deterred by capital punishment; indeed, if they 
merely conclude that justice requires such brutal deaths to be 
avenged by capital punishment; the creation of false, untextual, and 
unhistorical contradictions within “the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence” should not prevent them.68 
It is not hard to imagine why Justice Scalia chose the rape and murder 
of Sabrina Buie to justify the death penalty.  The crime was particularly brutal 
and was recounted with chilling detail by the North Carolina Supreme Court; 
the brevity with which McCollum’s narrative was treated, though, should be 
equally chilling.69 
Twenty more years would pass before the world would learn that what 
McCollum had always claimed was true: the prosecution’s narrative was 
false, and McCollum was innocent.  In 2014, DNA evidence exonerated 
McCollum and his co-defendant, implicating instead a man who lived just a 
block from where Sabrina’s body was found.70 
Together, the McCollum and Avery cases illustrate just how powerful 
prosecution-friendly narratives can become once adopted by an appellate 
court.  Indeed, the narrative employed against McCollum was so persuasive 
it was adopted as a justification for the imposition of the death penalty in an 
unconnected case.  Given the power of carefully woven and reinforced pros-
ecutorial narratives, retelling the story in a defense-friendly way will prove 
to be no easy task. 
                                                          
 65.  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994), denying cert to 988 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
 66.  Id. at 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 67.  Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 68.  Id. at 1143. 
 69.  State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 149 (N.C. 1993). 
 70.  Katz & Eckholm, supra note 63. 
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IV.  DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ROLE IN RETELLING THE NARRATIVE 
FOLLOWING A CONVICTION 
A post-conviction narrative will inherently challenge and contradict the 
existing narrative of the crime.  It must also incorporate some piece of new 
evidence, demonstrate its importance to the narrative, and do so in a way that 
is credible and compelling.71  How can litigators present this new evidence 
in a way that maximizes its credibility in the story without confusing or mud-
dling the narrative and without being overcome by the bias “baked in” to the 
already-established narrative of guilt? 
The worst way to do this might be the simplest—merely add the new 
evidence to the established narrative, like a footnote or a postscript.  Our nat-
ural bias is to interpret new information in light of the already established 
narrative.72  This “curse of knowledge” not only colors our view of the facts, 
but it also encourages us to be overly confident in the conviction and under-
estimate the impact of new evidence.73  People become wedded to their first 
impressions, known as “initial anchor values” in cognitive psychology liter-
ature.74  Adding new information—especially new information that contra-
dicts the ultimate conclusion of the narrative—can feel especially foreign or 
jarring when tacked on to the known, polished story.  It may also appear con-
venient or incredible, like an unconvincing deus ex machina in fiction.  
For new evidence to find its proper place in the narrative, the established 
story must be broken down and reframed to incorporate the new evidence 
naturally.  Doing so will not only counter the preexisting bias against the 
defendant but can also produce a genuinely compelling story in the defend-
ant’s favor.  Specifically, at least some of the inherent bias baked into the 
existing narrative can be overcome by, first, returning to primary sources 
when possible, second, broadening the narrative perspective and, finally, 
shifting the center of gravity of the story to the new evidence. 
A. Shifting Narratives in Fiction 
The problem of how best to add new, contradictory information to an 
established story is not unique to post-conviction litigation.  Changing a 
reader’s mind about a pre-existing narrative is, in effect, the idea behind a 
                                                          
 71.  See, e.g., State v. Petro, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947) (noting that new evidence must provide a 
“strong probability that the newly discovered evidence will result in a different verdict”).  
 72.  Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
317, 331–32 (2009). 
 73.  Id. at 332; see Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heu-
ristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 316 (2006) (finding that “peo-
ple adjust insufficiently from an initial anchor value because they stop adjusting once their adjust-
ments fall within an implicit range of plausible values”). 
 74.  Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 316.   
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“changeover” in film.75  In a “changeover,” additional information is pre-
sented at the end of the narrative that casts the foundation of the entire story 
preceding it in a new light.76  An effective twist in a fictional novel or film 
requires an author to actually create the “curse of knowledge” bias in a 
reader, only to counter it later.77  This technique introduces new evidence in 
a way that is powerful and memorable, what one creative writing scholar has 
called the “poetics of surprise.”78 
Countering the curse of knowledge, whether in fiction or a post-convic-
tion narrative, requires telling the initial story with care.  The narrative of the 
investigation and conviction “must include elements early on that are en-
dowed with some significance that will only be visible later.”79  In fiction, 
this involves subtle hints and foreshadowing about the twist to come.  In the 
post-conviction narrative, this involves finding and highlighting facts about 
the original investigation and conviction that are especially important to the 
new evidence—creating a negative space in that initial narrative that can be 
filled by new evidence. 
Popular fiction provides multiple examples of how powerful this tech-
nique can be.  In the film The Sixth Sense, the plot primarily centers on the 
relationship between Bruce Willis’s character, Dr. Malcolm Crowe, and a 
young boy he is treating.80  However, significant screen time is spent on a 
secondary plot involving what appears to be a strained relationship between 
Dr. Crowe and his wife.  The two are not speaking to each other.  She silently 
picks up the check at an anniversary dinner.  Several times we see the wife 
emotionally upset.  Several times we see her comforted by another man when 
she is in pain.  The film lingers on these moments to the point that Dr. 
Crowe’s marital problems become a significant subplot to the film.81 
In fact, the entire subplot was a highly effective way to call attention to 
a specific part of Dr. Crowe’s story that the screenwriter knew would look 
different with new information.  As the audience (and Dr. Crowe himself) 
learns that Dr. Crowe is dead, the film flashes back to the scenes of marital 
strife, which allow the audience to absorb the subplot in a completely new 
light.  Dr. Crowe’s wife’s apparent coldness is the result of the fact that she 
                                                          
 75.  Cf. Seth A. Friedman, Cloaked Classification: The Misdirection Film and Generic Duplic-
ity, 58 J. FILM & VIDEO 16, 19–21 (2006) (identifying the revelation of Tyler Durden’s character in 
the movie Fight Club as being the imagined alter ego of the narrator as an example of “changeo-
ver”). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Vera Tobin, Cognitive Bias and the Poetics of Surprise, 18 LANGUAGE & LITERATURE 
155, 157 (2009). 
 78.  Id. at 168. 
 79.  Id. at 157. 
 80.  THE SIXTH SENSE (Hollywood Pictures 1999). 
 81.  Id. 
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cannot see or interact with him.  Her tears are not for the state of her marriage, 
but for Dr. Crowe’s death.  The voice of the boy is recalled, reminding Crowe 
that dead people do not know they are dead.  The scales fall from the viewer’s 
eyes. 
As exciting as post-conviction cases can be, they will rarely have such 
a cinematic reveal.  Still, the same basic storytelling principles apply.  Newly 
discovered evidence will necessarily contradict some of the evidence pre-
sented at trial.  More precisely, what it contradicts is a specific interpretation 
of that evidence.  A good post-conviction narrative will tell the story of the 
investigation and conviction in a way such that the new evidence can snap 
into place in the story, recasting what readers initially believed was irrelevant 
or damning evidence.  This means first deconstructing the prior narrative and 
re-evaluating the full landscape upon which it was built. 
B.  Deconstructing the Existing Narrative 
As discussed above, the existing trial record is likely a result of at least 
some intentional bias and filtering.82  Trial testimony is prepared and inten-
tionally crafted by attorneys with a specific narrative in mind.  A few dozen 
pages of testimony will rarely capture the full scope of information contained 
in an extensive investigation.  And, depending on discovery practices in place 
at the time, the defense may not have had access to direct evidence that could 
have been used to impeach a State’s witness at trial.  Gaining access to the 
original police reports and witness statements is essential to recognizing and 
filtering out bias that may have crept into the trial. 
In fact, leaving aside intentional bias, second-hand summaries should 
never be relied upon as a foundation for post-conviction narratives.  Insofar 
as the truth is contained in the entire record, it cannot be presented on its face 
without summarizing and editing for content.  No matter how pure an au-
thor’s intentions, any decision about which facts to include and which to ex-
clude must reflect a point of view about the overall narrative.  Relying on a 
second-hand summary, however, increases the risk of innocently omitting 
critical facts that only look important in hindsight. 
It is easy to find real-world examples of how summarization can bias a 
narrative.  In 1975, three black men—Ricky Jackson, Kwame Ajamu, and 
Wiley Bridgeman—were convicted of the murder of a white salesman in 
Cleveland, Ohio.83  The case was based largely on testimony from a single 
                                                          
 82.  See supra Part II. 
 83.  State v. Jackson, No. 36181, 1977 WL 201428, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1977).  At 
the time of the trial, Kwame Ajamu’s legal name was Ronnie Bridgeman.  Maurice Possley, Ricky 
Jackson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-
tion/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4553 (lasted updated April 11, 2016).  After the trial, he changed 
his name.  Id.  
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witness, thirteen-year-old Eddie Vernon (“Vernon”).84  All three defendants 
were sentenced to death.85  Vernon’s recantation, almost forty years later, 
ultimately resulted in the exoneration of all three men.86 
On direct appeal of their decision, the appellate court devoted fourteen 
paragraphs to the State’s case, detailing testimony from over a dozen State’s 
witnesses.  The sole description of the defense came in a single paragraph at 
the end: “The defense offered many witnesses who contradicted parts of Ed-
die Vernon’s story.  An alibi was also presented.  At the close of all the evi-
dence, the defense again moved for acquittal.  The motion was denied.”87 
In fact, these “many witnesses” included several schoolchildren who 
confirmed that Vernon was on the school bus with them when the shooting 
happened, not on the sidewalk mere feet from the shooting as Vernon had 
testified.88  Jackson’s alibi consisted of multiple people who confirmed that 
neither he nor his co-defendants were anywhere near the shooting when it 
happened.89  At least one other witness, Karen Smith, had seen the actual 
shooters loitering at the scene just before the shooting.90  Smith confirmed 
that the men she saw were not any of the three co-defendants.91 
Given this evidence, the appellate summary might be seen as some kind 
of intentional effort to skew the evidence against Jackson.  And as described 
above, we know today that race almost certainly played a role in Jackson’s 
conviction and sentence.92  There is, however, a less nefarious explanation.  
The main strategy of Jackson’s attorneys on direct appeal was to attack the 
sufficiency of the evidence against him.93  In evaluating that claim, the court 
was required to weigh evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and had 
an obligation not to consider defense witnesses in deciding whether the State 
had presented a bare, prima facie case.94  The context of the claims framed 
the appellate court’s story.  An appellate court’s summary of the facts has its 
                                                          
 84.  Possley, supra note 83. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Ohio Man Ricky Jackson, Exonerated After 39 Years in Prison, Sues Police, NBC NEWS 
(May 19, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ohio-man-ricky-jackson-exon-
erated-after-39-years-prison-sues-n361531.  
 87.  Jackson, 1977 WL 201428, at *2.  
 88.  Transcript of Record at 784, 843–44, State v. Jackson, No. CR-75-020436-B (Ohio Ct. 
Common Pleas, Crim. Div., Aug. 11, 1975). 
 89.  Id. at 914–21, 951–71, 1104–10. 
 90.  Id. at 701–03. 
 91.  Id. at 735–36; Kyle Swenson, What the Boy Saw, CLEVELAND SCENE (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/what-the-boy-saw/Content?oid=2598138. 
 92.  See supra note 1. 
 93.  State v. Jackson, No. 36181, 1977 WL 201428, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 1977). 
 94.  State v. DeHass, 227 N.E.2d 212, 213 (Ohio 1967); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 319–20 (1979). 
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own purpose, which, intentionally or not, may not always include a complete 
and fair description of the entire trial. 
Nor can a full picture of the actual crime be found in the trial record.  
The record does not reflect the strong leads against other unrelated suspects, 
nor could it capture those suspects’ lengthy criminal histories after Jackson’s 
conviction.95  Trial testimony struggles at times to capture the predictable 
way that Eddie Vernon’s story evolved over time, eliminating previous in-
consistencies and incorporating information learned by police from other 
sources.96  All of these facts are found in primary sources—either recorded 
observations in police reports or direct witness statements.  Sometimes these 
facts do not make it to trial as the result of intentional trial strategy.  Other 
times facts might have been withheld by the State or simply missed by de-
fense counsel.  In Jackson’s case, the police file was disclosed to defense 
counsel during trial, and counsel did not receive an extension to investigate 
alternate suspects, questions regarding Vernon’s credibility, and tunnel vi-
sion in the police investigation.97  Whatever the circumstances of trial, a suc-
cessful and accurate post-conviction narrative requires knowing and under-
standing these original sources whenever possible. 
At first, returning to original sources might (and should) seem like a step 
backward in terms of clarity.  Getting closer to original sources will neces-
sarily blur and confuse the narrative of the crime.  Primary sources are often 
messy and inconsistent in minor or major ways.  They may show witness 
testimony evolving over time.  They may show police attitudes and theories 
evolving over time.  Various facts and statements may be frustratingly am-
biguous or open to multiple interpretations.  The narrative might become un-
wieldy and meandering in ways that might not always be helpful to the de-
fendant. 
But among that rubble are the cornerstones of the new story.  The most 
important kind of facts for the credibility of the new narrative are those which 
may have seemed insignificant at the time the prior narrative was created, but 
which might take on new significance in light of new evidence.  These are 
the lynchpins of the new story and will help frame not only the crime itself, 
but the investigation and conviction as well. 
C.  Broadening the Narrative Perspective 
The narrative created by an appellate court is the first “post-conviction” 
narrative and often the starting point for future courts as to what happened.  
                                                          
 95.  Swenson, supra note 91. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Transcript of Record, supra note 88, at 362–63, 378. 
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An appellate court will focus on the trial record, and it will present the narra-
tive in those terms.  Witness A testified to this, and Witness B testified to that.  
In a post-conviction context, however, this narrative—how the conviction 
happened—must be a part of the story itself.  Therefore, the narrative has to 
take a broader perspective.  Instead of simply recounting witnesses, a poten-
tial structure might be something like the following: 
1.  Description of the investigation. 
2.  Description of the trial and conviction. 
3.  Revelation of new evidence. 
All of these narratives orbit the central crime.  But beneath the surface 
must be a story about how the narrative—specifically, the false narrative—
was created during trial.  The focus is not only on “what happened” in the 
original crime.  It must also be on how police purported to discover “what 
happened.”  It must be about how information was added or subtracted for 
trial, about what story the jury heard, and finally how and why that story was 
incomplete.98 
With so many competing and often conflicting narratives, finding a sin-
gle appropriate perspective can be difficult.  Nonetheless, a post-conviction 
narrative should avoid the temptation to divine what “actually happened” in 
a third-person, omniscient sense.  A play-by-play narrative of the crime—
based on a defense theory or defendant’s alibi, and without explicitly refer-
encing factual sources—can come across as either confusing or phony.99  Po-
lice and prosecutors are quick, of course, to tell a jury the story of what “ac-
tually happened” in the crime.  But one of the major themes of a post-
conviction narrative is that one should be suspicious of these attempts.  The 
only story that can accurately be told about what “actually happened” leading 
up to the conviction is what actually happened in terms of the investigation 
and trial.  Not only will this present a less biased view of the crime, but it will 
often provide a more accurate picture of how an investigation and prosecu-
tion may have gone wrong. 
For similar reasons, aggressively attacking the State’s narrative during 
its introduction may also backfire.  Of course, in many wrongful conviction 
                                                          
 98.  DOUGLAS H. YARN, GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURES § 5:8, Westlaw (database updated May 2016) (“Employing an ‘outsider’s view,’ or a 
generalized view more prone to see decisions in their context of similarity with other situations, can 
provide the basis for comparisons that may reveal the existence of bias . . . .”). 
 99.  Because of heuristics related to anchoring, “judgments tend to be excessively influenced 
by an initial impression, perspective, or value.”  Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 311.  The initial 
“impression, perspective, or value” of the reader is not the one presented by the author after the 
conviction—the initial impression will come from the a priori assumption, post-conviction, that the 
inmate has been convicted and is likely guilty.  
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cases, there may be fairly obvious problems with the original conviction.100  
But the focus of the initial story should not be an authentic presentation of 
the crime; it should be an authentic presentation of the investigation and con-
viction.  Even audiences who may not be familiar with the facts of this par-
ticular case “know” something about it; they “know” that multiple actors, 
including a jury, have evaluated this evidence and found guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  They may “know” the frequency of meritorious motions for 
post-conviction relief is low.101  This knowledge is the foundation on which 
the defendant’s new story will (or won’t) be understood.102  A defendant was 
arrested, tried, and convicted, presumably by actors who were neither evil 
nor grossly incompetent at every stage.  If the narrative is presented in a way 
such that the audience cannot understand why police arrested the suspect or 
how a jury could have possibly convicted the defendant, the narrative might 
seem jarring and suspicious, and it might be rejected as unconvincing. 
It is important to note that adopting a broader perspective does not nec-
essarily mean telling the same story multiple times.  One of the most common 
mistakes law students make in wrangling with multiple narratives, however, 
is to recount each stage of the conviction from multiple perspectives in their 
entirety.  First, they might try to describe the basic facts of the crime from a 
kind of third-person, omniscient perspective.  Then they might describe the 
investigation, necessarily repeating many of the earlier facts as police purport 
to discover “what happened.”  Then, they might give a full description of the 
trial, where the same facts are often repeated a third time in the course of 
describing trial testimony.  These narratives are often presented unsympa-
thetically, sometimes interspersed with the new evidence that is the subject 
of the motion in order to challenge the narrative at each step. 
Repeating the chronology of the crime multiple times is poor storytell-
ing and a particularly poor way to counter the inherent biases against a de-
fendant.  Readers are likely to lose focus over the course of multiple re-
tellings.  Subtle differences in each narrative become difficult to remember 
and track.  Multiple complete retellings of the crime make it hard to remem-
ber where certain pieces of information first cropped up or how various actors 
came to the conclusions they did.  Worse, once a reader is told a particular 
story, they may be overconfident that they fully understood it,103 and they 
                                                          
 100.  Recognition and resistance of the “‘official’ but unsatisfying” explanation may, to some 
extent, be culturally ingrained.  Friedman, supra note 75, at 24. 
 101.  State v. Nichols, 463 N.E.2d 375, 378 (Ohio 1984) (“We are mindful that commentators 
have viewed the evolution of postconviction relief in Ohio as having created a virtually futile review 
process.”). 
 102.  See Epley & Gilovich, supra note 73, at 311 (“This anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is 
assumed to underlie many intuitive judgments . . .” and “explain[s] why judgments tend to be ex-
cessively influenced by an initial impression, perspective or value.”). 
 103.  Id. at 312–13 (discussing the effects of “anchoring”). 
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may be more likely to skim a lengthy retelling of that story.  Leaving key 
facts to the second or third full retelling of the crime means that those facts 
are likely to be lost in the mix. 
A more effective and coherent narrative, where possible, should use one 
single perspective to introduce the core facts of the crime and then focus only 
on key themes in or differences between the other perspectives as they arise.  
Facts should be introduced as they were discovered, with particular attention 
paid to how police and the jury reached a conclusion of guilt, and foreshad-
owing the impact of the new evidence that will be introduced later. 
For example, in a typical post-conviction case, almost all of the core 
facts of a crime can be told from the perspective of the investigation and pre-
trial interviews.  This story can use citations to the trial record but should try 
to be faithful to the perspective and chronology of the investigation as it ac-
tually unfolded.  Again, this is often easier if the writer has gone beyond the 
trial record to police reports and other contemporaneously created records. 
With this background, the narrative of the trial can be narrower.  Trial 
is rarely about actual fact-finding, but instead about how each side marshals 
its facts to create its story.  Thus, the trial narrative should not be a retelling 
of the crime—it is a story about the narratives themselves.  The description 
of trial can be brief, with a broader perspective about each side’s arguments.  
Retelling of facts should be limited to specifying which facts presented at 
trial differed greatly from the investigation.  Opening and closing arguments, 
in particular, are invaluable sources for each side’s story—for discovering 
what each side wanted to—and was able to—tell the jury about what the facts 
meant. 
D.  Introducing New Evidence Naturally in the Narrative 
With a proper lead-up, the new evidence can be introduced at the con-
clusion of the narrative, without hyperbole, and with just brief reminders of 
how it impacts the story.  This evidence should assimilate into the narrative 
naturally, and its impact should be as apparent as possible.  Of course, part 
of the effect of the twist is that it gains value from a reconsideration of the 
earlier facts,104 and the impact of the new evidence can be analyzed at length 
in the body of the brief.  But introducing the new evidence should not require 
fully retelling its place in the story.  If it does, then either the initial story was 
not properly set up, or the new evidence is simply not very strong.  As Tobin 
puts it: 
 The rule for this effect [in fiction] is that the ‘solution’ or revela-
tion should seem, in hindsight, to fit naturally with the information 
otherwise presented.  Conveniently, our curse of knowledge bias 
                                                          
 104.  Tobin, supra note 77, at 168. 
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encourages this very interpretation.  Provided that the revelation 
seems reasonable, consistent, and appropriate enough that the 
reader can accept it as a plausible outcome of or explanation for 
the previously narrated events, the curse of knowledge will en-
hance the effect, making the revelation seem retroactively obvious 
and inevitable.  It can make a good-enough fit feel exactly right.105 
Introducing new evidence properly can help take control of the cogni-
tive biases that unfairly disadvantage criminal defendants and present a more 
accurate and compelling post-conviction narrative. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A defendant charged with a crime who wants to create the predominant 
narrative faces several challenges.  Racial biases may pose an initial hurdle 
to the creation of a persuasive story.  The defendant’s efforts will be opposed 
by a prosecution team that controlled the timing of the initiation of charges 
and was thus able to settle on a narrative before litigation.  At trial, the pros-
ecution team has several other structural advantages, including the ability to 
present its narrative first, forcing the defense team to wait to respond until 
the story may have already been accepted as true by the trier of fact.  These 
advantages carry on into appeals, where a reviewing court bases its decision 
on a record that is the product of the prosecution team’s inherent narrative-
creating advantages.  In the post-conviction context, defense counsel must 
make special efforts, including the intentional discarding of earlier narratives, 
the use of a single perspective to introduce core facts of a case, and the careful 
weaving of newly available evidence into the narrative, to unravel the prose-
cution’s narrative and intentionally rebuild it around a complete version of 
the facts.  In this way, the defense can untell the prosecution’s story, undoing 
the acceptance of a false narrative and, hopefully, reversing a wrongful con-
viction. 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 168–69. 
